Warden
Warden security
Network-level IDS/IPS built into the core of ServersCamp. See what reaches your workloads, block bad traffic automatically, and turn on inline protection when you need it.
Pick a level from L0 to L3. Each one includes everything below it. Nothing runs on the machine itself.
Where Warden sits
Warden runs on ServersCamp infrastructure. It can inspect traffic before it reaches your machine, and after it leaves.
Before your machine
inbound protectionThe internet
scans · bots · exploits
Warden
on ServersCamp infrastructure
selected levelYour workload
VM · Gate · private subnet
same IP, untouched
Inbound traffic reaches Warden first. Bad sources and visible attacks are blocked before they ever hit the workload.
But protection does not stop at the door.
At L3, Warden also watches what leaves the workload: outbound to the internet, and east-west to other machines in the same private subnet.
After your machine
outbound + east-west containmentYour workload
compromised or abused
Warden
on ServersCamp infrastructure
at this levelThe internet
C2 · exfiltration · abuse
Another VM
same private subnet · lateral movement
A compromised workload cannot move or call out without crossing inspection.
The internet is already hitting your server. Most of it, you never see.
Give a machine a public IP and the traffic starts within minutes. Scanners, exploit kits, brute-force runs, old CVEs, new CVEs, and bots looking for anything that answers.
AI made the loop faster. More code gets shipped quickly, more apps go online half-hardened, and attackers automate the boring work: find, try, repeat.
| Source | Country | Signature | CVE | Last seen | Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 195.20.239.136 | DE | ET WEB_SPECIFIC_APPS PHP-CGI OS Command Injection (soft hyphen) | CVE-2024-4577 | 2h ago | blocked |
| 195.20.239.136 | DE | ET WEB_SERVER ThinkPHP RCE Exploitation Attempt | n/a | 2h ago | blocked |
| 195.20.239.136 | DE | ET EXPLOIT Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49 Path Traversal Attempt | CVE-2021-41773 | 2h ago | blocked |
| 77.83.246.97 | PL | ET WEB_SERVER /bin/sh In URI Possible Shell Command Execution | n/a | 3h ago | blocked |
| 152.32.225.99 | HK | ET INFO External Oracle T3 Requests Inbound | n/a | 5h ago | blocked |
| 151.243.150.23 | DE | GPL WEB_SERVER .htpasswd access | n/a | 10h ago | blocked |
| 192.142.28.77 | GB | ET HUNTING Suspicious Chmod Usage in URI (Inbound) | n/a | 12h ago | blocked |
| 117.175.140.79 | CN | ET WEB_SERVER ThinkPHP RCE Exploitation Attempt | n/a | 16h ago | blocked |
| 59.103.100.100 | PK | ET EXPLOIT D-Link Devices HNAP Command Execution | n/a | 20h ago | blocked |
| 34.162.191.237 | US | ET WEB_SPECIFIC_APPS WordPress Gravity SMTP Unauth REST API | CVE-2026-4020 | 1d ago | blocked |
| 45.135.195.139 | DE | ET WEB_SERVER Generic PHP Remote File Include | n/a | 1d ago | blocked |
| 198.50.202.93 | CA | ET WEB_SERVER ThinkPHP RCE Exploitation Attempt | n/a | 1d ago | blocked |
Every row is a real exploit or abuse attempt detected by Warden. Some of these sources were not on any reputation list yet: signatures caught what lists missed.
We left a clean machine online for 24 hours
We put a fresh machine online for a day with nothing running on it, told no one it existed, and logged everything that reached it.
Hit from everywhere, within the first hour.
That is the baseline for anything on a public IP. The traffic is already arriving. The real question is whether you can see it, and whether anything stops it. More in The background noise of the internet
The dangerous traffic is the traffic you allowed
Your service needs a way in. HTTPS stays open, SSH may stay reachable, your API, admin panel, database or game server needs a public path.
Warden sits on that path and watches who is coming in, what they are doing, and whether they belong there.
Defense in layers
Start with visibility. Move up when you want Warden to do more. Each level includes the one below it.
L0 · Map
See the traffic
A live map of connections: source, country, port, state and volume. Nothing is blocked. This is your public surface as the internet sees it.
L1 · Reputation
Drop the known bad
Known-bad sources from abuse feeds, spam lists and your own deny lists are dropped before they reach the workload. Your VM does not waste CPU or fill logs with traffic Warden already knows is bad.
L2 · Detect
IDSCatch what lists miss
Traffic is mirrored locally and inspected out of path for scans, probes, exploit attempts and visible attack patterns. When Warden sees abuse, it feeds L1 and blocks the source at the edge. Recommended default. Fails open.
L3 · Inline
IPSBlock in the path
A dedicated inspection engine sits inline for each protected backend. Attacks visible to policy are dropped before they reach the machine. Outbound and east-west inspection are available here.
L0 shows it. L1 drops known bad. L2 catches fresh abuse. L3 blocks inline.
What L3 adds
L3 moves the workload behind Warden, same IP and no change to the application. It is not a rule running inside the guest; it is a position in the network.
Same-subnet inline IPS, as a cloud primitive. One switch.
Inbound
Exploits, scans, brute-force attempts and suspicious packets are dropped before they reach the VM.
East-west
Traffic between your own machines can be inspected inside the same flat subnet. If one workload is compromised, its next move crosses inspection.
Outbound
A breached machine cannot quietly call home or push data out: its egress is inspected on the way out too.
The Warden family
Same security layer. Same levels. Different entry points.
L0 is free because seeing it matters
Before Warden blocks anything, it shows you what is already reaching your workload. A plain, read-only view of the traffic most VPS users never get to see.
- Live connection mapSee countries, sources, ports and connection states.
- Top sourcesFind who keeps coming back.
- Reputation hintsSpot sources already known to public blocklists.
- Connection auditSearch every external client seen in the last 24 hours.
L0 blocks nothing. It just shows you the traffic. Most people switch on L1 about a minute later.
Simple pricing after visibility
Start at L0 for free. Pay only when you want Warden to block, detect or sit inline.
L0 · Map
Live map, top sources, connection audit and reputation hints. Read-only visibility.
L1 · Reputation
Known-bad sources blocked at the edge. Good for basic blocklist-based protection.
L2 · Detect
Mirror-mode IDS. Detects scans, probes and visible attack patterns. Recommended default.
L3 · Inline
Dedicated inline IPS per protected backend. Inbound, outbound and east-west inspection.
Technical view
Telemetry off the flow table at L0, ACLs at the port for L1, a mirror at L2, a routed hop at L3.
Telemetry off the flow table
L0 is read-only. Every north-south flow to the resource is already in the fabric's connection-tracking table: one stateful entry per 5-tuple, carrying the original and reply tuples, the protocol state machine (SYN_SENT, ESTABLISHED, TIME_WAIT and the rest), per-flow packet and byte counters, and the conntrack zone it lives in. L0 dumps that table on the gateway chassis, attributes each entry to the resource by its public address, and renders it: live connections by state, top sources, ports and geo. It stores no new state, so visibility costs nothing on the path or in the guest. It just reads the tracker the data path already maintains. Because each entry already holds both tuples, the read-out tells ingress from egress and live sessions from half-open scans.
ACLs at the port, before DNAT
L1 is an ACL at the resource's port, evaluated before the packet is DNAT'd toward the backend. Source is matched against address-sets: bulk reputation feeds (spam, abuse, scanner, C2) plus the per-resource deny set that auto-bans write into. A hit drops at the edge, so the workload never sees the SYN. Matching is set membership, not a rule walk, so a deny set with millions of prefixes is still one ACL, still O(1) per packet. It rides the same stateful flow tracking as L0: only new flows run the full ACL, established connections match the flow table and forward, so reputation is paid once at setup, not per packet. Auto-bans close the loop: an L2 or L3 verdict writes the source into this set, and its next flow dies at the port.
Mirror mode
L2 is a SPAN-style port mirror: a copy of the workload's ingress and egress frames is fanned out to an inspection engine off the forwarding path. Zero added latency, zero MTU impact, inherently fail-open. Detection only, so verdicts feed the L1 reputation set rather than gating the packet.
Routed inline
L3 puts the engine in the forwarding path as a routed hop in front of the backend. Both directions traverse the same hop, so the path stays symmetric with no asymmetric-routing corner cases. Each packet is verdicted before it is forwarded, so drops land on the wire, not after the fact. The engine is per-backend, so one tenant's inspection load never touches another's.
Proxy ARP
The engine becomes the first hop without renumbering anything. It proxy-ARPs the protected address into the segment and answers for it, so the VM keeps its IP, its default gateway and its place in the same broadcast domain. Insertion is pure L2 adjacency: addressing, encapsulation and the guest routing table stay exactly as they were.
Fail-open
Inline is not a new single point of failure. Engine health is tracked out of band, and on degradation or loss the flow reverts to the L2 mirror path instead of fail-closing the backend. You lose inline enforcement, not reachability. Security degrades before connectivity does.
internet → your VM
↳ port mirror → Warden engine
copy only, off the forwarding pathinternet → Warden → your VM
symmetric routed hop, per-packet verdict, drops on the wire before the backendSimplified view. On the fabric it is programmable flow rules on the client's virtual switch, which is our network: a mirror group for L2, a routed proxy-ARP insertion with a stateful flow table for L3. Steering and verdicts happen below the guest, so the workload's NIC sees an unchanged adjacency.
Stop flying blind
A real IDS/IPS in front of your machine, built into the network, turned on with a single switch.