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Warden

Warden security

Network-level IDS/IPS built into the core of ServersCamp. See what reaches your workloads, block bad traffic automatically, and turn on inline protection when you need it.

Pick a level from L0 to L3. Each one includes everything below it. Nothing runs on the machine itself.

Where Warden sits

Warden runs on ServersCamp infrastructure. It can inspect traffic before it reaches your machine, and after it leaves.

Before your machine

inbound protection

The internet

scans · bots · exploits

incoming traffic

Warden

on ServersCamp infrastructure

selected level
L0L1L2L3
see · filter · detect · inline
allowed / inspected

Your workload

VM · Gate · private subnet

same IP, untouched

Inbound traffic reaches Warden first. Bad sources and visible attacks are blocked before they ever hit the workload.

But protection does not stop at the door.

At L3, Warden also watches what leaves the workload: outbound to the internet, and east-west to other machines in the same private subnet.

After your machine

outbound + east-west containment

Your workload

compromised or abused

outbound / east-west

Warden

on ServersCamp infrastructure

at this level
L3 inline
inspect · block · contain
inspected

The internet

C2 · exfiltration · abuse

Another VM

same private subnet · lateral movement

A compromised workload cannot move or call out without crossing inspection.

The internet is already hitting your server. Most of it, you never see.

Give a machine a public IP and the traffic starts within minutes. Scanners, exploit kits, brute-force runs, old CVEs, new CVEs, and bots looking for anything that answers.

AI made the loop faster. More code gets shipped quickly, more apps go online half-hardened, and attackers automate the boring work: find, try, repeat.

Exploit attempts against our fabricSeverity-1 detections from ServersCamp production. A recent sample, freshest first.
production sample
101detections · 24h
16unique sources
9countries
101blocked
SourceCountrySignatureCVELast seenAction
195.20.239.136DEET WEB_SPECIFIC_APPS PHP-CGI OS Command Injection (soft hyphen)CVE-2024-45772h agoblocked
195.20.239.136DEET WEB_SERVER ThinkPHP RCE Exploitation Attemptn/a2h agoblocked
195.20.239.136DEET EXPLOIT Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49 Path Traversal AttemptCVE-2021-417732h agoblocked
77.83.246.97PLET WEB_SERVER /bin/sh In URI Possible Shell Command Executionn/a3h agoblocked
152.32.225.99HKET INFO External Oracle T3 Requests Inboundn/a5h agoblocked
151.243.150.23DEGPL WEB_SERVER .htpasswd accessn/a10h agoblocked
192.142.28.77GBET HUNTING Suspicious Chmod Usage in URI (Inbound)n/a12h agoblocked
117.175.140.79CNET WEB_SERVER ThinkPHP RCE Exploitation Attemptn/a16h agoblocked
59.103.100.100PKET EXPLOIT D-Link Devices HNAP Command Executionn/a20h agoblocked
34.162.191.237USET WEB_SPECIFIC_APPS WordPress Gravity SMTP Unauth REST APICVE-2026-40201d agoblocked
45.135.195.139DEET WEB_SERVER Generic PHP Remote File Includen/a1d agoblocked
198.50.202.93CAET WEB_SERVER ThinkPHP RCE Exploitation Attemptn/a1d agoblocked

Every row is a real exploit or abuse attempt detected by Warden. Some of these sources were not on any reputation list yet: signatures caught what lists missed.

We left a clean machine online for 24 hours

We put a fresh machine online for a day with nothing running on it, told no one it existed, and logged everything that reached it.

Fresh installNo DNSNo published IPNo usersWatched for 24h
8,625packets blockedin 24 hours
818known-bad sourcescaught by reputation
394auto-banned by IDScaught by behavior
394missed by reputationcaught by signatures only

Hit from everywhere, within the first hour.

That is the baseline for anything on a public IP. The traffic is already arriving. The real question is whether you can see it, and whether anything stops it. More in The background noise of the internet

The dangerous traffic is the traffic you allowed

Your service needs a way in. HTTPS stays open, SSH may stay reachable, your API, admin panel, database or game server needs a public path.

Attackers do not need a secret door. They use the same one your users do.

Warden sits on that path and watches who is coming in, what they are doing, and whether they belong there.

Defense in layers

Start with visibility. Move up when you want Warden to do more. Each level includes the one below it.

L0 · Map

See the traffic

A live map of connections: source, country, port, state and volume. Nothing is blocked. This is your public surface as the internet sees it.

L1 · Reputation

Drop the known bad

Known-bad sources from abuse feeds, spam lists and your own deny lists are dropped before they reach the workload. Your VM does not waste CPU or fill logs with traffic Warden already knows is bad.

L2 · Detect

IDS

Catch what lists miss

Traffic is mirrored locally and inspected out of path for scans, probes, exploit attempts and visible attack patterns. When Warden sees abuse, it feeds L1 and blocks the source at the edge. Recommended default. Fails open.

L3 · Inline

IPS

Block in the path

A dedicated inspection engine sits inline for each protected backend. Attacks visible to policy are dropped before they reach the machine. Outbound and east-west inspection are available here.

L0 shows it. L1 drops known bad. L2 catches fresh abuse. L3 blocks inline.

What L3 adds

L3 moves the workload behind Warden, same IP and no change to the application. It is not a rule running inside the guest; it is a position in the network.

Same-subnet inline IPS, as a cloud primitive. One switch.

Inbound

Exploits, scans, brute-force attempts and suspicious packets are dropped before they reach the VM.

East-west

Traffic between your own machines can be inspected inside the same flat subnet. If one workload is compromised, its next move crosses inspection.

Outbound

A breached machine cannot quietly call home or push data out: its egress is inspected on the way out too.

The Warden family

Same security layer. Same levels. Different entry points.

L0 is free because seeing it matters

Before Warden blocks anything, it shows you what is already reaching your workload. A plain, read-only view of the traffic most VPS users never get to see.

  • Live connection mapSee countries, sources, ports and connection states.
  • Top sourcesFind who keeps coming back.
  • Reputation hintsSpot sources already known to public blocklists.
  • Connection auditSearch every external client seen in the last 24 hours.

L0 blocks nothing. It just shows you the traffic. Most people switch on L1 about a minute later.

Top sourceslast 24h
RO84.232.173.40
DE!45.135.195.139
NL!193.233.127.72
ES!212.81.188.12
US!103.143.10.79
Live connections
45.135.195.139DE:443ESTABLISHED
193.233.127.72NL:22SYN_SENT
84.232.173.40RO:80ESTABLISHED
103.143.10.79US:8080ESTABLISHED

Simple pricing after visibility

Start at L0 for free. Pay only when you want Warden to block, detect or sit inline.

L0 · Map

Live map, top sources, connection audit and reputation hints. Read-only visibility.

Freealways on

L1 · Reputation

Known-bad sources blocked at the edge. Good for basic blocklist-based protection.

€3per protected object

L2 · Detect

Mirror-mode IDS. Detects scans, probes and visible attack patterns. Recommended default.

€15per TB of traffic

L3 · Inline

Dedicated inline IPS per protected backend. Inbound, outbound and east-west inspection.

€40 /mo per endpointplus €30 per TB of traffic

Technical view

Telemetry off the flow table at L0, ACLs at the port for L1, a mirror at L2, a routed hop at L3.

L0 · map

Telemetry off the flow table

L0 is read-only. Every north-south flow to the resource is already in the fabric's connection-tracking table: one stateful entry per 5-tuple, carrying the original and reply tuples, the protocol state machine (SYN_SENT, ESTABLISHED, TIME_WAIT and the rest), per-flow packet and byte counters, and the conntrack zone it lives in. L0 dumps that table on the gateway chassis, attributes each entry to the resource by its public address, and renders it: live connections by state, top sources, ports and geo. It stores no new state, so visibility costs nothing on the path or in the guest. It just reads the tracker the data path already maintains. Because each entry already holds both tuples, the read-out tells ingress from egress and live sessions from half-open scans.

L1 · reputation

ACLs at the port, before DNAT

L1 is an ACL at the resource's port, evaluated before the packet is DNAT'd toward the backend. Source is matched against address-sets: bulk reputation feeds (spam, abuse, scanner, C2) plus the per-resource deny set that auto-bans write into. A hit drops at the edge, so the workload never sees the SYN. Matching is set membership, not a rule walk, so a deny set with millions of prefixes is still one ACL, still O(1) per packet. It rides the same stateful flow tracking as L0: only new flows run the full ACL, established connections match the flow table and forward, so reputation is paid once at setup, not per packet. Auto-bans close the loop: an L2 or L3 verdict writes the source into this set, and its next flow dies at the port.

L2 · mirror

Mirror mode

L2 is a SPAN-style port mirror: a copy of the workload's ingress and egress frames is fanned out to an inspection engine off the forwarding path. Zero added latency, zero MTU impact, inherently fail-open. Detection only, so verdicts feed the L1 reputation set rather than gating the packet.

L3 · inline

Routed inline

L3 puts the engine in the forwarding path as a routed hop in front of the backend. Both directions traverse the same hop, so the path stays symmetric with no asymmetric-routing corner cases. Each packet is verdicted before it is forwarded, so drops land on the wire, not after the fact. The engine is per-backend, so one tenant's inspection load never touches another's.

transparent

Proxy ARP

The engine becomes the first hop without renumbering anything. It proxy-ARPs the protected address into the segment and answers for it, so the VM keeps its IP, its default gateway and its place in the same broadcast domain. Insertion is pure L2 adjacency: addressing, encapsulation and the guest routing table stay exactly as they were.

resilient

Fail-open

Inline is not a new single point of failure. Engine health is tracked out of band, and on degradation or loss the flow reverts to the L2 mirror path instead of fail-closing the backend. You lose inline enforcement, not reachability. Security degrades before connectivity does.

simplified view
internet  →  your VM
   ↳ port mirror  →  Warden engine
     copy only, off the forwarding path
internet  →  Warden  →  your VM
     symmetric routed hop, per-packet verdict, drops on the wire before the backend

Simplified view. On the fabric it is programmable flow rules on the client's virtual switch, which is our network: a mirror group for L2, a routed proxy-ARP insertion with a stateful flow table for L3. Steering and verdicts happen below the guest, so the workload's NIC sees an unchanged adjacency.

Stop flying blind

A real IDS/IPS in front of your machine, built into the network, turned on with a single switch.